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From the North-East Felvidék to Podkarpatská
Rus (Kárpátalja), with Special Regard to the
Activity of Masaryk and Beneš
László Gulyás
In 1918–1919 the purest region of the Austro-HungarianMonarchy joined to the Czecho-
slovak Republic from the Hungarian Kingdom. At the first sight this was a simple
proceeding. But according to our opinion in fact, the 1918–1919 developments in the
history of the North-Eastern Felvidék were influenced four factors: 1. The conflicting
efforts of countries intending to keep (Hungary) and to acquire (Czechoslovakia, Roma-
nia, Poland and various Ukrainian state formations) the region. 2. The people’s assem-
blies of the Ruthenian and Hungarian populations, with their diverging (ukranophile,
hungarophile, czechophile) orientations and their searching for allies. 3. The activity of
the Ruthenian emigration in the US, strongly favouring one possible scenario (i. e. the
Czechoslovakian one). 4. The great powers’ decision about the fate of the region at the
Versailles peace talks. Our paper surveys a seemingly most important element of this
complex process, the activity of the Czechoslovak state founders Masaryk and Beneš;
we also intend to present how their work resulted in the North-East Felvidék becoming
Kárpátalja.
[History of Czechoslovakia; History of Podkarpatská Rus; Masaryk; Beneš]
Introduction, or Defining the Subject
A paper’s title usually provides the reader with an immediate direc-
tion about its contents and subject matter. In this case, however, the
title deserves some supplementary explanation. One such addendum
concerns the naming of the discussed area or region. Hungarian histo-
riography about themodern period tends to extremely neglect the pre-
cise definition of its concepts, especially about geographical names. In
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addition, Hungarian historiography does not incorporate the termino-
logical results of historical and political geography in its discussions
of the Carpathian basin.1 This is especially true about the so-called
historical regions: Délvidék, Erdély (Transylvania), etc. The region of
Kárpátalja would surely deserve a paper summarizing a debate and its
lessons, to clarify which term should be used to the region in various
periods. In the absence of such a study, I decided to use the terminol-
ogy that seemed most correct to me from the several options, includ-
ing Ruthenia and Carpathian-Ukraine.2 According to this, the region
which consisted of the Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa, and Máramaros provinces
of the Dualist era was named Kárpátalja by the creators of the Ver-
sailles Peace Treaty in 1919. As to the times before 1918, the unified
Carpathian-basin concept of Hungarian geography dictates that the
region is referred to as (the) North-East Felvidék.3 In other words, we
are on the opinion that using the term Kárpátalja regarding times be-
fore 1918 is incorrect.
The other addendum is the following: in our view, the 1918–1919
developments in the history of North-Eastern Felvidék were influ-
enced four factors:
1. The conflicting efforts of countries intending to keep (Hungary)
and to acquire (Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland and various
Ukrainian state formations) the region.
2. The people’s assemblies of the Ruthenian and Hungarian popu-
lations, with their diverging (ukranophile, hungarophile,
czechophile) orientations and their searching for allies.
3. The activity of the Ruthenian emigration in the US, strongly
favouring one possible scenario (i. e. the Czechoslovak one).
4. The great powers’ decision about the fate of the region at the
Versailles peace talks.
1 See L. T. VIZI, Trianon 100 Years Later. From Border Revision to National Cooperation
(1920–2010), Budapest 2018.
2 Zselicky lists 13 possible terms in the introduction of his work B. ZSELICZKY, Kár-
pátalja a cseh és a szovjet politika érdekterében 1920–1945, Budapest 1998, p. 7.
3 G. CSÜLLÖG GÁBOR, A Felvidék Magyarország történeti térszerkezetében, in:
S. FRISNYÁK – A. GÁL (eds.), Dr. Peja Gyo˝zo˝ emlékkönyv, Szerencsen 2007, pp. 201
to 225.
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Within the confines of our paper, this study details a seemingly most
important element of this complex process, the activity of the Czecho-
slovak state founders Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and Edvard Beneš; we
also intend to present how their work resulted in the North-East Fel-
vidék becoming Kárpátalja.
Views of the Czechoslovak Emigration on the North-East Felvidék,
1915–1918
The program of the group of Czechoslovak émigrés headed by Masa-
ryk and Beneš formed through the course of WWI.4 A focal point was
the autumn of 1915, when Masaryk drafted a memorandum on the
objectives of the Czechoslovak National Council.5 This manifesto was
published on November 14, 1915 at the same time in Switzerland,
France, Russia and in the US. Territorial goals were summarized as
follows: “From the Allied victory we expect the complete independence of
the Czech nation and the unification of actual Czechia with Moravia and Slo-
vakia, under the same government.”6
Another important rendition of the émigrés’ goals was communi-
cated by Beneš, publishing his book Détruisez l’Autriche-Hongrie ! Le
martyre des Tchéco-Slovaques à travers l’histoire in the autumn of 1917 in
Paris.7 Entente Powers were urged to “crush Austria-Hungary” and he
claimed that “the Czechoslovak state must emerge from their ruins, consti-
tuted by Czechia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia”.8
As to the Easten borders of the Czechoslovak state, he wrote as
follows: “the Czecho-Slovakian state shall be bordered by Russia in the
Carpathians, the two forming an impenetrable barrier against Germany”.9
4 L. GULYÁS, Egy sikeres emigráció anatómiája. E. Benes 1914–1918, in: AETAS,
2–3, 1996, pp. 103–118. See more L. GULYÁS, “ZÚZZÁTOK SZÉT AUSZTRIA-
MAGYARORSZÁGOT” Avagy a Masaryk-Benes-féle csehszlovák emigráció érv-
rendszerének elso˝ szintézise, in: Limes, 4, 2000, pp. 35–50.
5 F. HADLER (hrsg.), Weg von Österreich! Das Weltkrieg von Masaryk und Benes im Spie-
gel ihrer Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus des Jahren 1914–1918, Berlin 1995, p. 22, Doc.
No. 97.
6 G.G. KEMÉNY, Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez Magyarországon a dualizmus ko-
rában. VII. kötet 1914–1916, Budapest 1999, p. 77.
7 In Hungarian see: L. GULYÁS (ed.), Zúzzátok szét Ausztria-Magyarországot!, Docu-
menta Historica 5, Szeged 1992.
8 Ibidem, p. 45.
9 Ibidem.
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As obvious from the above excerpts, Masaryk and Beneš consid-
ered the Carpathians to be within Russian sphere of interest. Through
secret diplomatic channels, the leaders of emigration were kept in-
formed on Russian military goals. Thus they were aware that one war
objective of Russia was to acquire the Ukrainian-populated10 regions
of the Austro-HungarianMonarchy (Galicia, Bukovina and the North-
Eastern Felvidék).11 Masaryk based on his views on regionalism in ac-
cordance with this.12 His memoirs relate the following: “While Russia
was winning, it needed to be considered whether they were to claim Kárpát-
alja after invading Eastern Galicia.”13
The question arises: When and how the Czechoslovakian emigra-
tion leaders changed their mind about the North-Eastern Felvidék?
Masaryk’s memoirs provide the following answer: “Russia being de-
feated made it possible for Kárpátalja to belong to our republic.”14 The ci-
tation clearly suggests that as Russia was weakened by the events of
1917 (the revolution in February, the failure of Kerensky’s offensive,
etc.), Masaryk and Beneš began to consider the claiming of the North-
Eastern Felvidék as a possibility.
In May 1917, Masaryk visited Russia and stayed until April 1918.
During his time in Saint Petersburg, Moscow and Kiev, he met politi-
cians of various ranks to move forward the Czechoslovak cause, he
held public lectures, and wrote newspaper articles. The future of the
North-East Felvidék also came up in some of these meetings: “In Rus-
sia and especially in Ukraine, I had to address the plan [of the region be-
ing annexed to the Czechoslovak state], as several Ukrainian leaders dis-
cussed with me the future of all little-Ruthenians (Ukrainians). They had no
objections against Kárpátalja becoming ours.”15
During his stay in Russia and while travelling to the US from Vladi-
vostok, Masaryk dedicated another book to his views on the reorgani-
zation of Europe after the war, including the formation of a Czechoslo-
10 Leaders of the Russian Empire clearly considered the Ruthenians to be Ukrainians.
11 Az Elso˝ Világháború, Budapest 1980, p. 345.
12 T. SEATON-WATSON,Masaryk in England, New York 1943, pp. 44–45.
13 T.G. MASARYK, A világforradalom, Budapest 1990, p. 286.
14 Ibidem.
15 Ibidem.
228
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
L. Gulyás, From the North-East Felvidék to Podkarpatská Rus (Kárpátalja)
vak state.16 The volume was published in London in late 1918, titled
New Europa, the Slav Standpoint.17
In this work, he wrote the Ruthenians of the North-Eastern Felvidék
as follows: “The Ruthenians in Hungary have recently proposed a new plan.
Their representatives in the US favour the unification of their nation in the
Czechoslovakian state, becoming an autonomous part of the country. Natu-
rally, this proposal needs to be approved by the population in Hungary first.
These Hungarian Ruthenians – as they are called in America – are cruelly
oppressed by the Hungarians; their numbers are around a half million.”18
It seems reasonable that Masaryk changed his views from 1915 to
1916, as he claimed in 1918 that the region could be annexed to the
Czechoslovak state.
Masaryk and the Ruthenian Emigration in the US
Masaryk arrived at Vancouver, Canada, on April 29, 1918, from where
he travelled to Chicago. During the next weeks, he contacted the main
American organizations of the Czech, Slovak and Ruthenian emi-
grants and discussed with their leaders. Meanwhile, he also met in-
fluential personalities of the American political scene, most notably
president Wilson.19
Let us examine how relations betweenMasaryk and the Ruthenians
in America developed during these months. Prior to WWI, large num-
bers of Ruthenians had emigrated the US, mainly to the east coast.
Their organizations became politically active during 1918, with the
People’s Council of American Rusyns soon emerging as a new ma-
jor entity, formed by the merging of two Greek Catholic organizations
in Homestead on July 23, 1918. Nikolai Chopey was elected as pres-
ident, while lawyer Gregory Zhatkovych drafted the program of the
organization. His program involved three options as to the future of
the North-East Felvidék:
16 Before the publication of his book during the autumn in London, Masarykmust have
worked on the manuscript while still in the US, this is how the Ruthenians’ potential
joining the Czechoslovak state could be included in the text. The “official” Ruthenian
standpoint was communicated in early November 1918.
17 T.G. MASARYK, New Europa: The Slav Staindpont, London 1918.
18 Translated from the Hungarian edition, see T.G. MASARYK, Az Új Európa. A szláv
álláspont, Košice 1923, p. 100.
19 For details on his American activity, see MASARYK, A világforradalom, pp. 235–344.
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1. Total independence for the Ruthenians in Hungary, a sovereign
Ruthenian state.
2. Unification of Ruthenians in Hungary and the Galician and
Bukovina Ukrainians, and annexation of this territory to one of
the Slavic states, with granted autonomy (it remains unspecified
which Slavic state could that be).
3. Keeping the status quo, meaning that the North-Eastern Felvi-
dék remains within Hungary but with granted autonomy.20
With the help of a Democrat politician, Zhatkovych met president
Wilson in early October of 1918, then had meetings with Masaryk,
where the latter suggested to Zhatkovych that the Ruthenians could
side with the Czechoslovak state and gain full autonomy.
Meanwhile, Masaryk worked to form an organization encompass-
ing all Central European emigrants except Hungarians and Germans.
On November 3, 1918 he wrote the following to Beneš, who was in
Paris at the time: “This would be a constructive organization of small peo-
ples. Such is my idea and plan.”21 He continued with founding the Cen-
tral European Democratic Union, which was joined by the People’s
Council of American Rusyns. On November 7, Masaryk informed Be-
neš as follows: “We have the favour of the Hungarian Rusyns.”22
On October 23, 1918, members of the Central European Democratic
Union signed a Charta of independent central European peoples. On
November 12, 1918, the People’s Council of the American Rusyns or-
ganized a “referendum” in Scranton, with the participation of mem-
bers of the Ruthenian organizations in the US. To this day, the exact
circumstances and process of this referendum are unknown to his-
tory.23 However, the results are known and must suffice here: 67.2 %
20 About the formation and program of the organization see P. R. MAGOCSI, The Shap-
ing of National Identity Subcarpathian Rus 1848–1948, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1978,
pp. 77–78.
21 Z. ŠOLLE, Masaryk a Beneš ve svých dopisech z doby parˇížských mírových jednání v roce
1919, II. Seria B. T.G. Masaryk Ed. Benešovi, November 7, 1918, Praha 1994, pp. 124
to 125.
22 Ibidem, pp. 133–136.
23 The Hungarian historiography of the interbellum period refers to a weightless and
suspicious referendum, see for example: G. DARÁS, A Ruténföld elszakításának elo˝z-
ményei, Budapest 1936, pp. 107–108.
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voted in favour of joining the Czechoslovak state and 28.5 % voted
for being annexed to the Ukrainian state. 2.5 % favoured a separate
Ruthenian state, while 0.8 % voted for remaining within the borders
of Hungary.24
One day after the referendum, Zhatkovych met Masaryk in Wash-
ington and handed him the minutes from Scranton, and on November
15 he informed Wilson about the results of the referendum. This lat-
ter information greatly shaped the standpoint of the American peace
delegation at the Versailles Peace Conference.
The result of the Scranton referendumwas a great success for Masa-
ryk, providing a crucial argument in favour of annexing the North-
Eastern Felvidék to the Czechoslovak state. As we will see, this argu-
ment was utilized by Beneš at every possible occasion during the Paris
Peace Conference.
Beneš and the Issue of North-Eastern Felvidék at the Peace Con-
ference
On October 28, 1918, the Czechoslovak state was proclaimed in
Prague. The Slovaks joined on October 30 in Turócszentmárton, and
the cease-fire agreements of November 1918 put an end to the First
World War. These developments eliminated the relevance of the em-
igration led by Masaryk and Beneš. However, Beneš stayed in Paris
to work as the foreign minister of the first Czechoslovak government,
which was set up on October 28, 1918 in Prague. During the follow-
ing months, he worked in this position to establish the borders of
the Czechoslovak state.25 His Czechoslovak delegation handed over
11 written memoranda at the Peace Conference when they convened
in January 1919.26
MemorandumNo. 2 and No. 6 are most relevant to our subject mat-
ter. The seven chapters of memorandumNo. 2 summarize the Czecho-
slovak territorial demands, with chapter 4 dedicated to the issue of
24 I. VIDNYÁNSZKY, Önrendelkezési elvek és Kárpátalja állami hovatartozásának kér-
dése (1918–1919), in: Cs. FEDINEC – M. VEHES, Kárpátalja 1919–2009, Budapest
2010, pp. 39–44.
25 L. GULYÁS, Edvard Beneš. Közép-Európa koncepciók és a valóság, Máriabesnyo˝–Gödöllo˝
2008, pp. 144–177.
26 The full text of the memorandums is published in R.H. RASCHHOFFER, Die tsche-
choslowakischen Denkschriften für die Friedenskonferenz von Paris 1919–1920, Berlin,
1938.
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the Ruthenians.27 Memorandum No. 6 was titled “The problem of the
Ruthenians in Hungary”.28 As chapter 4 consists of only three pages,
we proceed with the analysis of the more extensive memorandum
No. 6.
Beneš listed the statistics of Ruthenians in the first section of the
memorandum and pointed out that while the Hungarian census of
1,900 had 429 thousand Ruthenians in register, data from the Greek
Catholic church refer to 488,000. The 60,000 difference was proof, as
Beneš explained, that the official Hungarian statistics distorted the
number of Ruthenians, presenting them as less numerous than their
actual numbers in the discussed region.
The second part of memorandumNo. 6 presented the “ethnic, polit-
ical and social situation” of the Ruthenians. First the geographical po-
sitions of the Ruthenian territories were discussed, where they lived
and in which provinces, then he claimed the following: “Emigration
was especially high in Ruthenian territories. Reasons include the oppressive
policies of the Hungarians and the complete abandonment on Budapest’s part,
as the Hungarian ruling elite regarded the territory as dangerous.”29 Be-
neš also blamed the Hungarian state for the fact that illiteracy among
Ruthenians was 85.5 %.
As it can be inferred, Beneš sketched up the darkest possible pic-
ture about the Hungarian rule, with the Hungarian state oppressing
the Ruthenians, who are poor, illiterate, and emigrating to escape the
oppression.
The third section of the memorandum was titled “The possible so-
lution of the problem”; Beneš presented four options as to the future
of the region:
1. The Ruthenians join the Russian state.
2. The Ruthenians join the Polish state.
3. The Ruthenians remain within Hungary.
4. The Ruthenian-inhabited areas are annexed to the Czechoslovak
state.
27 RASCHHOFFER, pp. 56–58.
28 Ibidem, pp. 206–223.
29 Ibidem, p. 210.
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About the first option, Beneš claimed that the majority of the Ruthe-
nians are unwilling to be annexed to Poland, which is not preferred by
the Polish politicians either (while he remained silent about a portion
of Polish leaders actually thinking otherwise).
He argued about the second scenario that the Ruthenians think “the
Russians should not descend on the far side of the Carpathians”.30 In our
view, the fallacy here is obvious, as the few Ruthenian intellectuals
were not considering global politics or geopolitical aspects. By men-
tioning the Russians possibly showing up within the Carpathian ba-
sin, Beneš in fact played upon the fears of the Entente leaders.
As to the third solution, Beneš claimed that the Ruthenians were
unlikely to leave the Hungarian state or were at least unwilling to do
so. However, the Hungarian state kept mercilessly oppressing them
before and after the war, Beneš argued.
He claimed that the fourth option seemed to be acceptable. His ar-
gument was as follows: “the Slovaks are neighbours of the Ruthenians,
they share the same race, and the dialect [Slovak] is close to Ruthenian. In
Ruthenian provinces the two populations are mixed and live in similar so-
cial and economic situations, their interests being completely the same. In
geographical terms, both regions are similar and homogeneous”.31
Some lines later Beneš even stated with certainty that “Ruthenians
in Hungary are a nation closely related to the Slovaks and living in very
similar conditions, they have a very close connection and their joining the
Czechoslovakian Republic would pose no difficulty”.32 Being aware of En-
tente rhetorics, Beneš immediately added that “annexing the territory
to the Czechoslovak Republic will be possible in case the Ruthenians either
accept it or they demand it themselves”.33
Right after the above sentences, he also concluded that the Rutheni-
ans living in the US had already formed their standpoint: “an autonomy
status within the territory of the Czechoslovak state would be acceptable”.34
The memorandum ends with the following idea: “We have identified the
30 Ibidem, p. 211.
31 Ibidem, p. 213.
32 Ibidem.
33 Ibidem.
34 Ibidem, p. 215.
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essence of the matter and the possible solutions. These are worth considering
and making the decision accordingly.”35
Leaders of the peace conference decided that, beside the submission
of written demands, minor allies (Romanians, South-Slavs, Czechoslo-
vaks) can appeal in spoken form as well, and on the highest level. So, it
came to pass that Beneš explained the Czechoslovak demands speak-
ing before the Supreme Council on February 5.
The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister spoke for 3.5 hours about his
country’s situation and their territorial demands.36 During this long
speech, he mentioned the issue of Kárpátalja as well. His views were
introduced with the following: “Neighbouring the Slovaks, there is a re-
gion to the East, populated by Ruthenians. These Ruthenians originate from
the same tribe as the Eastern Galicians, from whom the Carpathians separate
them. They live near the Slovaks, in similar social and economic conditions –
what’s more, an intermediate dialect has also emerged between the languages
of the two peoples.”37
Then he stated that Ruthenians did not intend to belong to the Hun-
garian state and have thus offered to join the Czechoslovak state. His
explanation continued as follows: “It would be unjust to leave them at the
Hungarians’ mercy, and though the issue was not among the Czechoslovak
demands at first, [he] took up presenting their cause before the Conference.”38
Two dishonesties can be detected here: on the one hand, the Ká-
rolyi Government gave the region autonomy in December 1918. On
the other hand, the Czechoslovak memorandums submitted to the
peace conference between December 1918 and January 1919 did in-
clude memorandum No. 2 and No. 6 that addressed the future of
Ruthenian territories. In other words, the Czechoslovak state had ex-
pressed their claim for the region by drafting the mentioned written
memorandums.
The Czechoslovak minister also highlighted in his speech the fol-
lowing: if Eastern Galicia were to belong to Russia, the possibility of
Kárpátalja becoming part of Russia would also emerge, meaning that
35 Ibidem.
36 The full text of Beneš’s speech is published in Paper Relating to the Relations of United
States 1919 the Paris Peace Conference (hereinafter only PCC), Vol. 1–12, Washington
1942–1947, Vol. 3, pp. 876–887.
37 PCC, Vol. 3, p. 887.
38 Ibidem.
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the Russian state would spread to within the Carpathians. However,
if Galicia were to be annexed to Poland, the Polish state would not
hold any claim to Kárpátalja. Which left two options, he argued, the
Ruthenians “have to become either Hungarian or autonomous. If the latter
happens, the Ruthenians intend to side with the Czechoslovak state”.39
Beneš basically repeated the arguments of memorandum No. 6 in
his spoken petition, using the following panels: Hungarians are op-
pressing the Ruthenians, a Russian annexation would result in serious
danger, the Ruthenians do not intend to remain within the Hungarian
state, the only acceptable solution is to annex them to Czechoslovakia,
which is supported by the Ruthenians themselves.
After hearing Beneš, the Supreme Council decided to set up a com-
mittee to examine the Czechoslovak demands. This is how the “Com-
mittee to Investigate the Czechoslovak Territorial Demands” came to
be.40
The first session of the Czechoslovak committee took place on Feb-
ruary 27, 1919,41 involving two Hungary-related agenda points: one
was the delineation of Slovakia’s borders, the other was the Ruthe-
nian issue, the question of Kárpátalja. A lively debate emerged among
the delegates regarding the Slovakian-Hungarian border, lasting for
several weeks.
However, the other agenda point was discussed and resolved dur-
ing this meeting. Seymour, one of the American delegates initiated the
discussion of the Ruthenian issue with the following proposal. The
American diplomat stated that he is in favour of the solution accord-
ing towhich Ruthenian-populated territories should be annexed to the
Czechoslovak state and granted autonomy. However, he also listed the
necessary conditions: first, Czechoslovak politicianswere to guarantee
to the peace conference that they would indeed grant the Ruthenians
autonomy. Second, “[i]t must be confirmed that the Rusyns are in favour
of this solution”.42
Salvaggo-Raggi, an Italian delegate and vice-chair of the commit-
tee, was on the contrasting opinion that the Ruthenians should be
39 Ibidem.
40 Ibidem.
41 The minutes are published in M. ÁDÁM – M. ORMOS, Francia diplomáciai iratok a
Kárpát-medence történetébo˝l 1918–1919, Budapest 1999, pp. 154–158.
42 Ibidem, p. 156.
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annexed to that neighbour to which they are connected through eco-
nomic, strategic and political interests, i. e. the Hungarians. In reply
to this, British committee member Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out to the
less than well-informed vice-chair that the committee was intending
to prevent the territory from belonging to Hungary, or else this would
counter the connection between the Romanian and Czechoslovak
states. General Le Rond, a French delegate argued as follows: “an-
other solution could be that the Rusyns are annexed to the Romanians”.
Then he continued with the self-countering argument that there was
a religious contrast between the Greek Catholic Rusyns and Orthodox
Romanians, which “could be a source of conflicts. This leaves the solution
suggested by the American delegates, namely the annexation of Rusyns to the
Czechoslovaks. This is not perfect, but it is the most reasonable”.43
French delegate Laroche reminded the committee that the idea of
annexing the territory to Poland had also emerged. However, he also
concluded his talk supporting the Czechoslovak option.
In contrast to the forming American-English-French standpoint,
Salvaggo-Raggi made a last attempt and argued that the Hungarian
solution should not be ruled out without investigating first. He sup-
ported his idea with the following: “By annexing the Rusyns to Czecho-
slovakia, all transport between Hungary and Poland would be disrupted. This
could result in a huge upheaval in the country’s [Hungary’s] economy.”44
Sir Joseph Cook, the other British delegate replied stating that “the
truth of the matter is to decide whether we intended to push the Rusyns into
friendly or hostile treatment. The answer must be obvious, as the Rusyns
would rather side with the Czechoslovaks than with the Hungarians”.45
Cook’s declaration put an end to the debate, with French chair of
committee Jules Gambon concluding that “the majority of the committee
is in favour of the unification of Rusyns and Czechoslovaks, thus the issue is
in theory resolved”. Then he asked Salvaggo-Raggi if he had any objec-
tions to this. The Italian delegate maintained that he “was still on the
opinion that this solution is a wrong one; but all in all, [he] did not wish
to submit a formal objection to a solution that is unfavourable for a hostile
state”.46
43 Ibidem, p. 157.
44 Ibidem.
45 Ibidem.
46 Ibidem.
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Therefore, the fate of the North-Eastern Felvidék was decided and
the territory was annexed to the Czechoslovak state. The decision was
approved by higher entities of the Peace Conference during March
and April of 1919.
Masaryk and the Kárpátalja Issue “on the Field”
While Foreign Minister Beneš was working successfully in Paris to-
ward the annexation of Kárpátalja to Czechoslovakia, Masaryk return-
ed to Prague on December 20, 1918, took the presidential office of the
new state, and made efforts to the same end. He ordered the Czecho-
slovak Army to occupy the North-Eastern Felvidék.
By his command, the Czechoslovak troops took the Western part
of the region on January 12, 1919. Led by Italian general Ciaffi, the
31st regiment of the Czech legion invaded Ungvár. In early February,
Masaryk’s personal political commissioner arrived and began talks
with the Rusyn Council in Ungvár. As a result, politicians represent-
ing the various Ruthenian political entities (councils of Eperjes, Huszt,
Ungvár) that gathered in Czechoslovak occupied Ungvár formed the
Central Russian (Ruthenian) National Council on May 8, 1919. The
same day the council declared joining Czechoslovakia.47 The delega-
tion of more than a hundred persons led by Avgustin Volosin, handed
the resolution to president Masaryk on August 12, 1919 in Prague. The
event marked the beginning of Ruthenian political powers’ activity
within the Czechoslovak state.48
Conclusion
Masaryk and Beneš were fully successful with the Ruthenian problem;
first as emigration leaders, then as the president and the foreign min-
ister of the Czechoslovak Republic, both in Paris and Ungvár. Their
triumph was acknowledged by Austria on September 10, 1919, in the
Saint-Germain Peace Treaty. The treaty stated that the territory was
part of the Czechoslovak state, under the name of Podkarpatská Rus.
47 Cs. FEDINEC (ed.), A Kárpátaljai magyarság történeti kronológiája 1918–1944, Galánta –
Dunaszerdahely 2002, pp. 53–54.
48 A. TÓTH, The Position of Carpathian Ruthenia in the Political System of the First
Czechoslovak Republic on the Background of the Issue of Parliamentary Elections
and Preferences of Main Political Currents by Carpathian-Ruthenian Voters (1918–
–1938), in:West Bohemian Historical Review, 1, 2016, pp. 57–78.
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In terms of international law, the process which transformed the for-
mer North-Eastern Felvidék into Podkarpatská Rus.
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